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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DUTY OF FAIR
REPRESENTATION IN ONTARIO
L. P. CARR '
As trade unions grow in membership and importance, the welfare
of more and more employees is controlled by their activities. For
better working conditions and for the settlement of his grievances,
the employee must turn to his union. This generally works to the
benefit of the employee. But in some cases, the union may decide
to sacrifice the rights of certain employees in order to benefit the
others. There are also instances where employees are harmed by
inadvertent acts, or inactivity, of officers of the trade union. What
rights does an employee have against his trade union when it has
injured him, consciously or otherwise? The answer to this question
is vital, because by statute, in both the United States and Canada,
the trade union is the exclusive bargaining agent for the employees
it represents. The individual employee must arrive at a contract and
settle his grievances with his employer through his trade union. The
employee's rights directly against his employer are very limited. How
can the employee force his trade union to act in his best interests?
Section 32 (1) of the Ontario Labour Relations Act provides:'
32.(1) Every collective agreement shall provide that the trade union
that is a party thereto is recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent
of the employees in the bargaining unit defined therein.
In the United States, section 9 (2) of the National Labor Relations
Act reads in part as follows :2
9(a) Representatives designated or selected for the purpose of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representative of all employees in
such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment:
These sections are broadly similar in intent. In the United States,
the courts have used section 9(a) as the basis for a duty of fair
representation. The Ontario courts have developed no such duty.
Why? Would one be desirable? What would be its implications for
labour relations? This paper will attempt to answer these questions,
first by describing the duty as it exists in the United States, and then
by looking at related developments in Ontario.
The duty of fair representation was first enunciated in the
United States in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville ?. Co. et al.3 The
plaintiff, a Negro fireman employed by the defendant railway, brought
an action against both the employer and the trade union, requesting
an injunction against the enforcement of a recent amendment to the
collective agreement, on the ground that it was discriminatory. That
* L. P. Carr, B.A. (Ottawa University), LL.B. (Queen's University).
1 R.S.O. 1960, c. 202, as am. by 1961-62, c. 68, 1962-63, c. 70, 1964, c, 53,
1966, c. 76.
2 61 State. 136, 29 U.S.C.A. s. 151.
3 323 U.S. 192, 65 S. Ct. 226 (1944).
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amendment provided in effect that in the future only white firemen
were to be employed and promoted. Under the Railway Labor Act,4
the respondent trade union was exclusive bargaining agent for all
firemen employed by the Railroad. By its constitution, the Brother-
hood excluded Negroes from its membership, although a substantial
minority of employees were Negroes. Stone C.J. for the United States
Supreme Court, said:
So long as a labor union assumes to act as the statutory representative
of a craft, it cannot rightly refuse to perform the duty, which is insepar-
able from the power of representation conferred upon it, to represent
the entire membership of the craft. While the statute does not deny to
such a bargaining labor organization the right to determine eligibility
to its membership, it does require the union, in collective bargaining and
in making contracts with the carrier, to represent non-union or minority
union members of the craft without hostile discrimination, fairly, im-
partially, and in good faith.4a
The court gave judgment for the employee. It must be noted that
this case arose under the Railway Labor Act, which speaks of the
trade union as the "representative" of all employees. 5 When a similar
case, Ford Motor Co. v. Huff man,6 arose under the National Labour
Relations Act, the same duty of fair representation in the negotiation
of collective agreements was held to exist. However, in this case, the
court found that the union's duty of fair representation was not
breached. Recognizing that the trade union must serve conflicting
interests of various employees, it held that the union does not breach
its duty of fair representation if it displays "complete good faith
and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its discretion." The clause
of the collective agreement in question, giving extra seniority to
employees who had fought in the war, was held to have been arrived
at in good faith.
The next step of importance was the extension of the doctrine
from cases involving the negotiation of collective agreements to cases
concerned with the enforcement of the collective agreement. Almost
simultaneously, the National Labor Relations Board and the United
States Court found that the trade union, as exclusive statutory bar-
gaining agent, must fairly represent the employees not only in nego-
tiating agreements, but also in the settlement of grievances.
The National Labor Relations Board took the step in the Miranda
Fuel Co. 6a case in 1962, when it said, after referring to the Steele
case (supra),:
Viewing these mentioned obligations of a statutory representative in the
context of the "right" guaranteed employees by Section 7 of the Act[N.L.R.A.] "to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing," we are of the opinion that Section 7 thus gives employees the
right to be free from unfair or irrelevant or invidious treatment by their
exclusive bargaining agent in matters affecting their employment. This
4 45 U.S.C.A. ss. 151, 152.
4a 323 U.S. at 204; 65 S. Ct. at 233.
5 Railway Labor Act s. 1, subd. 6, s. 2, subds. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9; 45 U.S. C.A.
ss. 151, 152.
6 345 U.S. 330, 73 S. Ct. 681 (1953).
6a 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962).
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right of employees is a statutory limitation on statutory bargaining
representatives, and we conclude that Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act
accordingly prohibits labor organizations, when acting in a statutory
representative capacity from taking action against any employee upon
considerations or classifications which are irrelevant, invidious, or unfair.7
The Board held the union had breached its duty of fair repre-
sentation when it insisted that, pursuant to the collective agreement,
an employee lose his seniority. On the facts, however, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision.8 Nevertheless, in the
subsequent case of Local Union No. 12, United Rubber Workers of
America v. N.L.R.B.,9 the Fifth Circuit upheld the Miranda Fuel doc-
trine that a breach of the duty of fair representation constituted an
unfair labour practice. It will be noted, firstly, that the Board founded
the union's duty of fair representation on sections 7 and 8(b)10 of
the N.L.R.A., and not on section 9(a) as had the Supreme Court in
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman. Secondly, in the United Rubber Workers
case, the court suggested (obiter) that the Board's jurisdiction would
pre-empt suits in the courts.
In 1964, while, as we have just seen, the N.L.R.B. was unsure
of its jurisdiction over the duty of fair representation as an unfair
labour practice, the United States Supreme Court in Humphrey v.
Moore," decided that the duty of fair representation extended to
grievance settlements, and that the courts had jurisdiction to hear
suits alleging breach of that duty under section 301(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act.12 On the merger of the operations of two
companies, the union had agreed with the employer to integrate the
two seniority lists, thereby giving the employees of the older com-
pany, whose operations were being absorbed, preference over the
employees of the absorbing company. Because the union's action was
found to have been in good faith, there was no breach of the duty
of fair representation. The court held there was "insufficient proof
of dishonesty or intentional misleading on the part of the union' 13
to warrant finding a breach of the duty. These strong words would
seem to rule out union liability for mere negligence in carrying out
its duty. Thus the court, even as it adopted, on the basis of s. 9 of
the N.L.R.A., a duty of fair representation in the settlement of griev-
ances, went a long way to restrict it. As well, it expressly reserved
7 140 N.L.R.B. at 185.
8 326 F. 2d 172 (1963).
9 368 F. 2d 12 (1966).10 N.L.R.A., s. 7: Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid orprotection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agree-
ment requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employ-
ment as authorized in section 8(a) (3).
s. 8(b): it shall be an unfair labour practice for a labor organization or
its agents (1) to restrain or coerce (a) employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7....11 375 U.S. 335, 84 S. Ct. 363 (1964).
12 29 U.S.C.A. s. 185(a).
13 375 U.S. at 349; 84 S. Ct. at 371.
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to the union, together with the employer, the right to amend the
collective agreement itself. Thus, so long as the union acts in good
faith, in what it believes to be the interests of the employees, then,
however unreasonble such a belief might be, the union is free to
bargain away individual rights. This of course, is subject to the vested
rights theory, as recently stated in Shechy v. Seilon, Inc.: 14
... where an employee has complied with the conditions of his contract
of employment, [and] benefits have been promised and conferred on
him by his employer as an inducement for the continuance of his service
to the employer, ... he acquires, by the promise and agreement of his
employer, a vested right to these benefits, and in the absence of good
and sufficient causes for forfeiture, he may not be deprived thereof,
notwithstanding a proviso in the contract of employment to the contrary.
This duty of fair representation, developed and applied by the
court in Humphrey v. Moore, was adopted and followed in the recent
case of Vaca v. Sipes.15 In this case, an employee was discharged as
being physically unfit for work. His own doctor certified that he
was fit, but the company doctor did not agree. The union undertook
to process his grievance, but abandoned it after having him examined
by a third doctor who found him unfit. Although the jury found
that the employee was physically fit for the work, the Supreme Court
dismissed the employee's action on finding that the union had acted
in good faith. This decision is unjust to the employee who has been
wronged and is now left without remedy. How can such a restriction
on the scope of the duty be justified?
The court cites a number of reasons for leaving the conduct of
grievances in the hands of the union:
(a) both the employer and the union contemplate that most
grievances should be settled short of arbitration;
(b) the settlement process eliminates frivolous grievances and
unnecessary expense;
(c) both sides are assured of consistency in the results;
(d) the settlement process furthers the interests of the union
as statutory agent.
What the decision does is to limit the rights of the employee in
favour of the interests of the union as a whole. Only where there
is a patent breach of faith, consisting of arbitrary and discriminatory
conduct, or to use the words in Humphrey v. Moore,16 "dishonesty
or intentional misleading" on the part of the union, will the employee
have a remedy. The Vaca case would even limit the right of the
employee against his employer to those cases where the union has
breached its duty. This last limitation is obiter in the Vaca case.
Nevertheless, it is obiter coming from the highest court in the land
and in the subsequent case of Williams v. Wheeling Steel Corp.'7 it
was taken as law. In that case, the plaintiff-employee was allowed
14 227 N.F. (2d) 229, at 230 (1967) (S.C. Ohio).
Is 87 S. Ct. 903 (1967).
16 Supra, note 9.
17 65 L.R.R.M. 2080 (1967-D.C., W.Va.).
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to continue his action against the defendant corporation only after
he had shown that the union had possibly breached its duty of fair
representation. The main action is now lis pendens: it will be interest-
ing to see whether the court actually finds a breach of duty by the
union. Indeed, no actual breach has yet been found in any court case
dealing with the union's duty of fair representation in settling
grievances.'8
The court in the Vaca case, as in the Humphrey case, held that
the duty of fair representation, being one implied in the contract as
a result of the union's position as exclusive bargainhig agent, was
justifiable in the courts under section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act. It thus rejected the doctrine of pre-emption by the
N.L.R.B. in matters of duty of fair representation, which doctrine
the U.S. Court of Appeals, in the United Rubber Workers case,19 had
suggested might apply. This doctrine, enunciated in San Diego Build-
ing Trades Council v. Harman,20 states that, generally, neither state
nor federal courts have jurisdiction over suits directly involving ac-
tivities which arguably come within the jurisdiction of the N.L.R.B.;
the puroose being to avoid conflicting administration of the Act.
Thus, both the N.L.R.B. and the courts of the United States have
found that unions have a duty of fair representation towards the
employees. Although, since the time of the United Rubber Workers
case, the N.L.R.B. has not been faced with complaints alleging an
unfair labour practice on the part of the union in breaching its duty
of fair representation, it does seem that the Board is more willing
to find a breach of that duty than the courts are. Indeed, in both
the Miranda Fuel case and the United Rubber Workers case, the
Board found a breach of the duty of fair representation. However,
perhaps a court faced with the facts of the United Rubber Workers
case, would also have found a breach of duty. The test used by the
N.L.R.B. in determining breach of duty is whether the union has
acted on "irrelevant, invidious, or unfair" considerations. It is sug-
gested that the Board thus imposes a greater duty upon the union than
do the courts, which insist on intentional bad faith. The scope of the
duty seems to be broader, at the present time, before the N.L.R.B.
than before the courts. This is probably desirable in view of the
observation in the United Rubber Workers case that remedies in the
courts in this area are somewhat inadequate. 21
Having thus examined the origins and scope of the duty of fair
representation in the United States, let us see what purpose it is
intended to fulfil in the scheme of labour relations. White J. in Vaca
v. Sipes says that "the duty of fair representation has stood as the
bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals
stripped of the traditional forms of redress by the provisions of the
18 Humphrey v. Moore (supra); Vaca v. Sipes (supra); Palmieri v. Steel-
workers, 65 L.R.R.M. 2709 (1967-D.C., W. Pa.).
19 Supra, note 9.
20 359 U.S. 236, 79 S. Ct. 773 (1959).
21 368 F. 2d at 23.
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federal labor law." 22 But that is all it does: it protects the individual
from arbitrary union conduct. It does not give him a remedy when-
-ever he is wronged. Indeed, in the Vaca case itself, as the jury found,
the employee was physically fit for his work but he was denied a
remedy. He cannot sue the union unless it has breached its duty; he
cannot even sue the employer unless the union has breached its duty
of fair representation. 23 He is without remedy. The reason for this,
as stated in Vaca v. Sipes24 is public policy: to protect free collective
bargaining and safeguard the arbitration process. If the employee
were given a right to compel arbitration, then the grievance proce-
dure as we now know it would fall into disrepute, each employee being
able to press his grievance despite a union decision that it would be
best for all to settle short of arbitration. Furthermore, giving this
right to the employee would be contrary to the statutory provisions
to the effect that the union is the exclusive bargaining agent.
Thus in the United States there is a statutory duty of fair repre-
sentation imposed on the trade union. Such duty is implied by the
courts from the wording of s. 9(a) of the N.L.R.A.; and the breach
of that duty is found to constitute an unfair labour practice under
sections 7 and 8 of the said Act, over which the N.L.R.B. will assume
jurisdiction.
In Ontario, the words of s. 32(1) of the Labour Relations Act
are similar to those of s. 9 (a) of the N.L.R.A. A duty of fair repre-
sentation could thus be implied, the breach of which would give
grounds for a complaint before the Ontario Labour Relations Board
under section 65 of the Act.25
In the Wallace Barnes Co.26 case, an employee alleged she was
discharged in violation of the collective agreement, and, by the opera-
tion of s. 37,27 contrary to the Labour Relations Act. The union had
processed and settled the grievance. The Board refused to hear her
application on the ground that to do so would defeat the purposes
of the Act which requires arbitration of grievances 28 and which
declares the union to be the exclusive bargaining agent for the
employees. 29 In delivering its decision, the Board set out principles
which have since governed the Board in hearing s. 65 complaints
brought by employees, and which are similar to principles stated in
the American cases.
22 87 S. Ct. at 912.
23 Williams v. Wheeling Steel Corp., supra.
24 87 S. Ct. at 917.
25 Ontario Labour Relations Act, s. 65(4) (a) "... if the Board is satisfied
that the person concerned has been... dealt with contrary to this Act as to
his employment, opportunity for employment or conditions of employment by
any employer or other person or a trade union, it shall determine what [shall
be done].., with respect thereto...
26 61 C.L.L.C. 928 (O.L.R.B.).
27 Ont. L.R.A., s. 37: "A collective agreemeht is, subject to and for the
purposes of this Act, binding upon the employer and upon the trade :union
that is a party to the agreement whether or not the trade union is certified
and upon the employees in the bargaining unit defined in the agreement."
28 S. 34.
29 S. 32(1), supra, note 1.
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(a) The Act contemplates that all disputes will be settled pur-
suant to the terms of the collective agreement. "The ulti-
mate decision, whether it be by negotiation or arbitration,
is binding not only on the parties but on the employees as
well."30
(b) The Board cites and adopts the language used by J. Finkle-
wan in The Corporation of the City of Toronto case, (1947),
D.L.S. 7-1289 at 7-1291:31
. . . The inability of an individual employee or any group of
employees to have a grievance dealt with finally and conclusively
does not enter into the consideration at all and rightly so because
the Regulations are concerned with collective relations between
the employer and an individual employee. Harmony in industrial
relations is not necessarily achieved by pursuing to its ultimate
conclusion every grievance, real or fancied, that may arise in
the course of the day's work .... 32
(c) ... it is clear that the legislation intended that in order to
gain the advantages of collective bargaining, employees must
be prepared to surrender rights which they might otherwise
have. 33
On the facts in the Wallace Barnes case, the union had processed
the employee's grievance and settled the dispute short of arbitration.
What if the union had refused to pursue the grievance? That is what
happened in the Heist Industrial Services case.34 The Board proceeded
on the assumption that the union had breached the collective agree-
ment in refusing to carry the grievance; and yet it held that this did
not constitute a breach of the Labour Relations Act such as to give
the Board jurisdiction under s. 65. Implicit in this decision is the
denial of a duty of fair representation under the Act. The Board did
not even inquire into the union's motives, but held that the Act was
not breached.
However, three months later, in the Pitt Street Hotel case,35 the
Board said that it would have jurisdiction to hear a complaint by
an employee, although an alternative remedy exists under the col-
lective agreement, in exceptional circumstances, as where the em-
ployer and the union act in collusion to deny an employee his rights.
No collusion was found in that case. But, if this dicta is accepted,
then it is obvious that we have here a start of the duty of fair repre-
sentation. The employee will not be bound by a collusive action of
the union and employer.
In the above three cases before the O.L.R.B., the employee was
complaining against the employer, not the union, although his reason
for bringing the complaint was his dissatisfaction with the union's
30 61 C.L.L.C. at 931.
31 47 C.L.L.C. 1203 at 1205.
32 61 C.L.L.C. at 931.
33 61 C.L.L.C. at 930.
34 63 C.L.L.C. 1123.
35 63 C.L.L.C. 1148.
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conduct of the case. In 1966, an individual named Boivin, made a
complaint under s. 65 of the Labour Relations Act directly against
the union.36 He alleged that the union procured his discharge in
violation of the collective agreement. Boivin was a member of Local
800 of the Plumbers' union in Sudbury. He obtained a "travel permit"
which he properly filed in local 67 in Hamilton, thus entitling him
to the privileges of membership in local 67. By the collective agree-
ment, the employer was bound to lay off any non-member of local 67
in preference to a member of the said local. There being other
members of local 67 not working, the union, disregarding Boivin's
travel permit in order to favour its own members, required the
employer to lay off the complainant. The Board held that the union
had dealt with the complainant contrary to the Act and granted the
complainant damages, saying that it would also have ordered rein-
statement had the employer been made a party to the application.
The Board, at the request of the union, later reconsidered its decision 37
and affirmed it.
In the Boivin case, the Board set an important precedent. It held
that a breach of the collective agreement was a breach of s. 37 of
the Act, set out above.38 The collective agreement being binding upon
the trade union, "the procuring of the dismissal of the complainant
in violation of this agreement constitutes, in our opinion, a dealing
with him contrary to the provisions of the Labour Relations Act .... -39
The Board went on to say "that the deliberate procuring of a wrongful
breach of such a binding agreement must be, at least in the circum-
stances of this case, contrary to the Act." The Board purported to
distinguish the Heist Industrial Services case-but the distinction is
not very clear. There is room for a distinction of fact: in the Heist
case, the union was passive, in that it refused to carry out a griev-
ance; whereas here, in the Boivin case, the union actively procured
the complainant's dismissal.
This decision does not detract from the reasoning in the Wallace
Barnes case, that case being concerned with the interpretation of the
agreement, a matter to be left with the parties. In Boivin, the facts
disclose an intentionally wrongful act of the union. The case falls,
as the Board holds, within the "exceptional circumstances" alluded to
in the Pitt Street Hotel case.40
In what circumstances will the Board exercise jurisdiction when
the subject matter of a dispute falls under the collective agreement
and is subject to arbitration? Three 1967 cases before the Ontario
Labour Relations Board would indicate that generally, to use
American terms, the jurisdiction of an arbitration tribunal would
36 Boivin v. United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the
Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, Local
67, [1966] O.L.R.B. 513.
37 [1966] O.L.R.B. 617.
38 Supra, note 17.
39 [1966] O.L.R.B. at 517.
40 Supra, p. 11.
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pre-empt the jurisdiction of the Board. If the matter in dispute comes
within the terms of the collective agreement, the employee must
first submit his complaint to arbitration, as provided by that agree-
ment. This is made clear in Thompson v. Scarboro Board of Educa-
tion4' and in Hood v. General Bakeries Ltd.,42 both of which cite the
famous passage from the Wallace Barnes case:
The trade union is also their bargaining agent with respect to the ad-
ministration of the collective agreement and when disputes arise involv-
ing the interpretation or alleged violation of the agreement, these are
matters for the partes to that agreement, that is, the trade union and
the employers.43 (italics are mine)
In both these cases, the Board refused to hear a complaint that
the employees were dealt with contrary to section 50(a) of the Act,
referring the matter back to arbitration.
In July 1967, a similar complaint was also dismissed by the
Board on the same grounds in Canadian Union of Shipbuilding and
Marine Workers (C.N.T.V.) v. Collingwood Shipyards, Division of
Canadian Shipbuilding and Engineering Ltd.44 The C.N.T.V. repre-
sented four employees who were previously shop stewards in a rival
union, the United Steelworkers of America. After an illegal walkout,
these four were not permitted to return to work, whereas another
150 employees were so permitted. They lodged a grievance under the
collective agreement which was in effect between the Steelworkers
and the employer. The Board refused to hear the complaint because
it came within the jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal. The court
said that to exercise jurisdiction may give rise to two conflicting
decisions, each of which could be filed in the Ontario Supreme Court
for enforcement.
Nevertheless, the Board, in dicta, mentioned special circum-
stances (as in the Pitt Street Hotel case), where it might exercise
jurisdiction:
(a) where the adversely interested representative union does not
press the arbitration to a conclusion.
(b) where the representative union, in the arbitration proceed-
ings, breaches the "duty of good faith representation."
(c) where the arbitration board finds the matter to be outside
its jurisdiction.
Where does this leave the duty of fair representation as adminis-
tered by the Ontario Labour Relations Board? First, it must be
mentioned that only in the Collingwood Shipyards case has the Board
ever mentioned such a duty. From the Pitt Street Hotel case, it may
be assumed that the Board will not defer to an arbitration award
where the union is guilty of collusion with the employer. And from
the Boivin case, it is probably fair to say that whenever the union
41 O.L.R.B., Jan. 1967 Rep., 822.
42 O.L.R.B., Jan. 1967 Rep., 823.
43 61 C.L.L.C. 928.44 O.L.R.B., July 1967 Rep., 376.
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breaches the collective agreement, at least actively, it may be liable
therefor to the employee who has been wronged. Indeed, an active
breach of the collective agreement can be interpreted as a breach
of the Labour Relations Act and may be grounds for a complaint
under s. 65 of the Act.
In March, 1967, the Board decided the case of Ocepek v. Inter-
national Association of Machinists, Lodge No. 1031.45 This was a com-
plaint under s. 65, alleging that the union had breached the collective
agreement. In essence the union, upon the merging of two companies
the employees of which it represented, proposed that the seniority
lists of the two companies be fully integrated. The membership voted
down this proposal, with the result that the employees of the acquired
company lost their seniority rights under their collective agreement.
The complaint alleged that the union breached the agreement in
allowing the complainants to lose their seniority. The Board held
there was no such breach, the union and the company having "done
nothing in any way adverse to the complainants interest."46 This case
is important in two respects. First, it implies that a settlement ratified
by the membership cannot amount to a breach of the agreement; the
board thus opened the door for oppression of the minority by the
majority, so long as the officers of the union do nothing (i.e. no active
breach of duty) adverse to the complainant's interest. Second, the
Board treated as established law the fact that a breach of the col-
lective agreement could give rise to a complaint under section 65:
indeed, the Board considers the issue to be, not whether a breach
of the agreement is a breach of the Act, but whether the evidence
discloses a breach of the agreement. Board member Irwin, in his
concurring opinion, states:
There is no evidence of violation of any provision of the collective agree-
ment presently in effect between the respondent company and Inter-
national Association of Machinists, Lodge No. 1031, or any substantive
provision of the Labour Relations Act.
Hence, any breach of a collective agreement may now be con-
sidered as a breach of the Act. But the Board will still refuse to
exercise jurisdiction if there is a remedy under that collective agree-
ment, except in special circumstances such as those mentioned in the
Pitt Street Hotel, Boivin, and Collingwood Shipyard cases.
The Ontario Labour Relations Board has not developed a duty
of fair representation as such. But it has developed something quite
analogous to it, requiring that the Union officers do nothing adverse
to the employees' rights and interests under the collective agreement.
Is the American duty of fair representation any wider in scope? Or
can a breach of that duty be readily shown only when there is a
breach of the agreement? The denial of a remedy to the aggrieved
employee in both the Humphrey and Vaca cases would suggest that
though the duty of fair representation is wider in scope than is the
45 [1967] O.L.R.B. March Report 99F.
46 Id. 999.
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duty not to breach the contract or the Act, in actual practice, both
may be largely equivalent.
Having thus examined what limitations the Ontario Labour
Relations Board imposes on the activities of trade union in settling
disputes, let us see how the courts treat unions in similar situations.
There are only two cases in Ontario in which members of a
union have challenged the action of their exclusive agent, both having
been decided within the last year. In the first, Re Bradley et al. and
Ottawa Professional Fire Fighters Association4 7 the applicants sought
to quash an arbitration award which denied them the promotion they
had been given by their employer. The arbitration award had resulted
from a grievance initiated by other employees who claimed that they
were entitled to the promotion under the terms of the collective agree-
ment. The union brought a policy grievance, but the arbitrator, in
his award, expressly ordered the applicant demoted. No actual breach
of duty, nor damages, were proven. But the Court of Appeal held,
reasoning in the same way that it had in the Hoogendorn case,48
that this was really in the nature of an individual grievance, the
award being made in relation to individuals, and that the applicants
were denied natural justice. It therefore quashed the award. The
court explained that the applicants were denied the opportunity to
be properly represented in the arbitration proceedings, though their
rights were involved. The employer could not be counted on to repre-
sent the employees it had promoted; nor could the union, which was
pursuing the grievance on behalf of other employees of adverse
interests.
Once it is accepted, as it must be, that the benefits running to employees
may differ according to job classification or seniority ranking (to take
two illustrations), and that the representative union is put to a choice
between employees who competed for the same preferment as to whichit will support against a different choice made by the employer, substan-
tive employment benefits of particular employees are put in issue and
they are entitled to protect them if the union will not.
It follows that they are entitled to notice of arbitration proceedings taken
to test their right to continued enjoyment of the benefits.49
This result was arrived at, as suggested above, on the basis of
dicta of the Court of Appeal itself in the Hoogendorn case.5 0 In that
case, the union grieved against the employer to have the latter comply
with a term of the collective agreement requiring the dismissal of
any employee who refused to join the union and pay union dues.
Hoogendorn, the employee concerned, had refused to join the union
on religious grounds. The arbitrator ordered that the employer comply
with the collective agreement. The Court of Appeal refused to quash
the decision of the arbitrator on the ground that this was a policy
47 [1967 2 O.R. 311 (C.A.).
48 Infra, note 50.
49 [19673 2 O.R. at 317.
50 Re Hoogendorn and Greening Metal Products, [19663 2 O.R. 746, 58
D.L.R. 2d 338 (H.C.); [19673 1 O.R. 712, 62 D.L.R. 2d 167 (C.A.); (1967) 65
D.L.R. 2d 641 (S.C.C.).
19681
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
grievance, and implied that there was no breach of natural justice
nor any breach of the duty of fair representation, if there was such
a duty in Ontario. As pointed out above, Re Bradley was distinguished
on the ground that it was an individual grievance and that there was
a breach of natural justice in not giving notice of the arbitration to
the complainants, being employees whose interests might be affected
by the award.
On appeal of the Hoogendorn case to the Supreme Court of
Canada,51 it was held that, although the grievance was framed as a
policy grievance, i.e., the interpretation of those parts of the agree-
ment dealing with deduction of union dues, it was in fact an individual
grievance, because the decision would affect the rights of a specific
individual, Hoogendorn. The issue was then whether natural justice
had been done-and the answer was no, since Hoogendorn was not
given notice of the proceedings, (though he knew of them), nor was
he given the opportunity to be adequately represented.
Thus we have only two cases in Ontario where an employee has
attacked an arbitration award on the ground that the union was not
his true representative. In both cases, judgment was given for the
employee. What is more interesting is that the employee was given
a remedy in circumstances under which, applying the duty of fair
representation as elaborated in Vaca v. Sipes (supra), he would have
been denied a remedy in the United States. For it is obvious that
in neither of the two Ontario cases did the union breach its duty of
good faith; in neither did the union act upon "irrelevant, invidious,
or unfair" considerations; 1 and in neither case was the union arbi-
trary and discriminatory.5 2
We return to the question: does the duty of fair representation
exist in Ontario? Perhaps it would be more appropriate to ask: does
the employee have any remedies against his exclusive bargaining
agent when it has wronged him. To this question, the answer must
be yes. It would even seem that the employee has greater rights in
Canada against his union than his counterpart in the United States.
Indeed, the American employee must abide by a decision reached by
his union in good faith, despite the possibility that the union's decision
was unreasonable, and whether in fact the employee has been wronged
or not. In Ontario, if the union's action is collusive with the em-
ployer,53 or, as recent cases5 4 seem to indicate, if the union's action
breaches the collective agreement, and thereby, by the operation of
s. 37, the Act itself, (and generally, it is submitted, a bad faith
decision of the union will result only from collusion or breach of the
agreement), then the employee can apply to the Ontario Labour
Relations Board to seek redress. Even if the union's action is neither
collusive nor in breach of the agreement, the employee in Ontario
51 (1968) 65 D.L.R. (2d) 641.
52 See note 5, supra.
53 See Vaca v. Sipes, supra.
54 Supra, Pitt Street Hotel case, 10.
55 See Boivin and Ocepek cases, supra.
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will still have redress before the courts if he can show that he is the
victim of a breach of natural justice.55
Furthermore, the Vaca case suggested, and the Williams case 56
confirmed, that in the United States an employee has no remedy
against his employer unless the union has breached its duty of fair
representation. In Ontario, however, there is strong authority that
the employee has a right of action against his employer upon an
established right (the existence of which was either conceded or
pronounced upon by an arbitration tribunal or by the Labour Rela-
tions Board) no matter what the position of the union.5 7 The position
of the employee in Ontario is therefore much better than in the
United States.
Do these greater rights of the employee in Ontario detract from
the role of the trade union as exclusive bargaining agent? It seems
not. The union and employer can still effectively settle a grievance
short of arbitration, and such settlement will be respected by the
O.L.R.B. and by the courts. But if in settling a grievance the union
impeaches upon the rights of the employee, either under the Labour
Relations Act or under the collective agreement, then it seems that
the O.L.R.B. or the courts will grant him a remedy. The employee
will not have a remedy in all situations: he had no remedy in the
Wallace Barnes case and he would have no remedy if the Vaca v.
Sipes situation occurred in Ontario. But when the employee's interests
conflict with those of the union, the employee has a right to be heard,
under the Hoogendorn principle, which right was denied him in the
American Miranda Fuel case (supra). The Ontario courts and the
O.L.R.B. thus truly recognize the union's exclusive agency; yet they
are determined to curb all abuses of this agency whether or not the
agent has acted in good faith.
56 Supra, Hoogendorn case.
57 Supra, pp. 6, 7.
58 Re Grottoli v. Lock (1963) 39 D.L.R. 2d 128; Hamilton Street Railway
v. Worthcott (1966) 58 D.L.R. 2d 709 (S.C.C.); Close v. Globe and Mail (1967)
60 D.L.R. 2d 105.
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